Searched refs:mitigation (Results 1 – 25 of 42) sorted by relevance
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| /linux-5.19.10/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/ |
| D | mitigation-patching.sh | 9 local mitigation="$1"
14 orig=$(cat "$mitigation")
21 echo 0 > "$mitigation"
22 echo 1 > "$mitigation"
27 echo "$orig" > "$mitigation"
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| D | Makefile | 4 TEST_PROGS := mitigation-patching.sh
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| D | mds.rst | 26 Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
103 - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
107 The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
109 - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
124 Best effort mitigation mode
128 mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
129 effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
147 enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
156 The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
168 Virtualization mitigation
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| D | special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 87 the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
89 disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
97 Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
103 disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
104 enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
108 Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
113 The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
117 off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
131 Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
133 mitigation
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| D | tsx_async_abort.rst | 99 …- The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applie…
111 Best effort mitigation mode
115 mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
116 effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
133 enables the mitigation by default.
136 The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
139 Virtualization mitigation
159 off This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
163 full TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
165 systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
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| D | processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 10 provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are
110 section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to
117 specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation
153 same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before
166 additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs.
168 For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
177 Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
188 Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
200 full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
204 complete mitigation.
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| D | spectre.rst | 144 For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
331 mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
334 The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
358 retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
359 CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
372 The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
382 'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation
385 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
433 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
437 Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
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| D | l1tf.rst | 78 The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
92 PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
158 Host mitigation mechanism
165 Guest mitigation mechanisms
282 of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
351 Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
354 significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
359 There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
386 mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
394 flush,nosmt Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
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| D | multihit.rst | 88 - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
125 The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
133 force Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
141 auto Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
166 to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
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| D | l1d_flush.rst | 39 mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported.
63 cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/x86/ |
| D | tsx_async_abort.rst | 3 TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
33 Kernel internal mitigation modes
54 not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
58 TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
66 …A_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
81 …A_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
96 …A_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
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| D | mds.rst | 1 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
73 All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
82 command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
98 The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
112 Kernel internal mitigation modes
130 line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
140 on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
144 The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
173 switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
187 The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
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| D | buslock.rst | 98 that mitigation is not needed.
119 This is an effective mitigation in cases where a minimal impact can be
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/userspace-api/ |
| D | spec_ctrl.rst | 9 The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
36 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
38 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
48 If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/driver-api/thermal/ |
| D | cpu-idle-cooling.rst | 90 the duty cycle percentage. When no mitigation is happening the cooling
93 When the mitigation begins, depending on the governor's policy, a
133 mitigation begins. It is platform dependent and will depend on the
138 for thermal mitigation, otherwise we end up consuming more energy.
194 potentially invert the mitigation effect
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| D | intel_dptf.rst | 190 are integrated into host systems like notebook PCs. One of mitigation
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ |
| D | hypercalls.rst | 47 firmware support for the workaround. The mitigation status for the
51 available to the guest and required for the mitigation.
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| /linux-5.19.10/drivers/thermal/qcom/ |
| D | Kconfig | 40 hardware(LMh). LMh allows for hardware-enforced mitigation for cpus based on
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/admin-guide/ |
| D | kernel-parameters.txt | 2393 Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
2534 never: Disables the mitigation
2543 Control mitigation for L1D based snooping vulnerability.
2554 This parameter controls the mitigation. The
2557 on - enable the interface for the mitigation
2559 l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
2586 hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
2599 hypervisor mitigation.
2915 Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
2927 This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/networking/ |
| D | driver.rst | 74 mitigation scheme to let TX packets "hang out" in the TX
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/infiniband/ |
| D | ipoib.rst | 74 use ethtool to set interrupt mitigation parameters and thus reduce
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| /linux-5.19.10/kernel/ |
| D | Kconfig.preempt | 129 - mitigation of some (not all) SMT side channels;
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| /linux-5.19.10/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/ |
| D | Kconfig | 97 reduces RX interrupts by itself. Interrupt mitigation reduces RX
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/process/ |
| D | embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 143 response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation
159 participate in the mitigation development.
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| /linux-5.19.10/Documentation/PCI/ |
| D | boot-interrupts.rst | 23 PCH and mitigation within BIOS and the OS.
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