| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/iommu/iommufd/ ! |
| D | device.c | 690 static int iommufd_access_change_ioas(struct iommufd_access *access, in iommufd_access_change_ioas() argument
693 u32 iopt_access_list_id = access->iopt_access_list_id; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
694 struct iommufd_ioas *cur_ioas = access->ioas; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
697 lockdep_assert_held(&access->ioas_lock); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
700 if (cur_ioas != access->ioas_unpin) in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
710 access->ioas = NULL; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
713 rc = iopt_add_access(&new_ioas->iopt, access); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
715 access->ioas = cur_ioas; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
722 if (access->ops->unmap) { in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
723 mutex_unlock(&access->ioas_lock); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/ ! |
| D | rxe_mw.c | 51 struct rxe_mw *mw, struct rxe_mr *mr, int access) in rxe_check_bind_mw() argument
61 if (unlikely((access & IB_ZERO_BASED))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
94 if (unlikely(mr->access & IB_ZERO_BASED)) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
100 if (unlikely(!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
107 if (unlikely((access & in rxe_check_bind_mw()
109 !(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
116 if (access & IB_ZERO_BASED) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
136 struct rxe_mw *mw, struct rxe_mr *mr, int access) in rxe_do_bind_mw() argument
141 mw->access = access; in rxe_do_bind_mw()
172 int access = wqe->wr.wr.mw.access; in rxe_bind_mw() local
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| D | rxe_mr.c | 48 static void rxe_mr_init(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init() argument
60 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init()
67 void rxe_mr_init_dma(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_dma() argument
69 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_dma()
99 bool persistent = !!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_FLUSH_PERSISTENT); in rxe_mr_fill_pages_from_sgt()
130 int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_user() argument
135 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_user()
139 umem = ib_umem_get(&rxe->ib_dev, start, length, access); in rxe_mr_init_user()
212 bool persistent = !!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_FLUSH_PERSISTENT); in rxe_set_page()
334 int access, in copy_data() argument
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| /linux-6.6.21/include/linux/ ! |
| D | iommufd.h | 50 void iommufd_access_destroy(struct iommufd_access *access);
51 int iommufd_access_attach(struct iommufd_access *access, u32 ioas_id);
52 int iommufd_access_replace(struct iommufd_access *access, u32 ioas_id);
53 void iommufd_access_detach(struct iommufd_access *access);
63 int iommufd_access_pin_pages(struct iommufd_access *access, unsigned long iova,
66 void iommufd_access_unpin_pages(struct iommufd_access *access,
68 int iommufd_access_rw(struct iommufd_access *access, unsigned long iova,
83 static inline int iommufd_access_pin_pages(struct iommufd_access *access, in iommufd_access_pin_pages() argument
92 static inline void iommufd_access_unpin_pages(struct iommufd_access *access, in iommufd_access_unpin_pages() argument
98 static inline int iommufd_access_rw(struct iommufd_access *access, unsigned long iova, in iommufd_access_rw() argument
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| D | device_cgroup.h | 16 short access);
19 short type, access = 0; in devcgroup_inode_permission() local
32 access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
34 access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
37 access); in devcgroup_inode_permission()
61 short access) in devcgroup_check_permission() argument
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| /linux-6.6.21/security/ ! |
| D | device_cgroup.c | 38 short access; member
118 walk->access |= ex->access; in dev_exception_add()
146 walk->access &= ~ex->access; in dev_exception_rm()
147 if (!walk->access) { in dev_exception_rm()
250 static void set_access(char *acc, short access) in set_access() argument
254 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) in set_access()
256 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in set_access()
258 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in set_access()
302 set_access(acc, ex->access); in devcgroup_seq_show()
328 u32 major, u32 minor, short access) in match_exception() argument
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| /linux-6.6.21/sound/core/ ! |
| D | control_led.c | 49 unsigned int access; member
81 static inline unsigned int access_to_group(unsigned int access) in access_to_group() argument
83 return ((access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_LED_MASK) >> in access_to_group()
92 static struct snd_ctl_led *snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access() argument
94 unsigned int group = access_to_group(access); in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access()
137 static void snd_ctl_led_set_state(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int access, in snd_ctl_led_set_state() argument
145 led = snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(access); in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
165 lctl->access = access; in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
199 unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_remove() argument
206 if (lctl && (access == 0 || access != lctl->access)) { in snd_ctl_led_remove()
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| /linux-6.6.21/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ ! |
| D | Smack.rst | 10 Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access
33 access to systems that use them as Smack does.
50 load the Smack access rules
53 report if a process with one label has access
85 Used to make access control decisions. In almost all cases
95 label does not allow all of the access permitted to a process
102 the Smack rule (more below) that permitted the write access
110 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
115 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
131 access
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/platform/chrome/ ! |
| D | cros_ec_lpc_mec.c | 79 enum cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_access_mode access, new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec() local
91 access = ACCESS_TYPE_BYTE; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
93 access = ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
98 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
126 if (new_access != access || in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
127 access != ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT) { in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
128 access = new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
129 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
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| /linux-6.6.21/kernel/kcsan/ ! |
| D | kcsan_test.c | 152 } access[2]; member
159 const bool is_assert = (r->access[0].type | r->access[1].type) & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT; in __report_matches()
182 if (r->access[1].fn) { in __report_matches()
187 scnprintf(tmp[0], sizeof(tmp[0]), "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
188 scnprintf(tmp[1], sizeof(tmp[1]), "%pS", r->access[1].fn); in __report_matches()
191 cmp < 0 ? r->access[0].fn : r->access[1].fn, in __report_matches()
192 cmp < 0 ? r->access[1].fn : r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
194 scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
204 if (!r->access[1].fn) in __report_matches()
209 const int ty = r->access[i].type; in __report_matches()
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| /linux-6.6.21/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ ! |
| D | fs_test.c | 552 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
573 for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
574 path_beneath_dir.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
579 path_beneath_file.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
582 if (access & ACCESS_FILE) { in TEST_F_FORK()
635 __u64 access; member
676 add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access, in create_ruleset()
697 .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | in TEST_F_FORK()
704 _metadata, rules[0].access | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, in TEST_F_FORK()
746 .access = ACCESS_RO, in TEST_F_FORK()
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/dma/ ! |
| D | user.c | 87 args->v0.version, args->v0.target, args->v0.access, in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
90 dmaobj->access = args->v0.access; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
120 switch (dmaobj->access) { in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
122 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_VM; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
125 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
128 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_WO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
131 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RW; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
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| /linux-6.6.21/arch/arm/include/asm/ ! |
| D | arch_timer.h | 28 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u64 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
30 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
42 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
60 u32 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
64 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
72 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
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| /linux-6.6.21/fs/afs/ ! |
| D | security.c | 131 h += permits->permits[i].access; in afs_hash_permits()
168 if (permits->permits[i].access != caller_access) { in afs_cache_permit()
233 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
237 new->permits[j].access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_cache_permit()
244 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
327 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit_rcu()
367 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit()
402 afs_access_t access; in afs_permission() local
416 !afs_check_permit_rcu(vnode, key, &access)) in afs_permission()
430 ret = afs_check_permit(vnode, key, &access); in afs_permission()
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| /linux-6.6.21/Documentation/security/ ! |
| D | landlock.rst | 12 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
20 system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
21 LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
31 Guiding principles for safe access controls
34 * A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
40 * Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
47 Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_.
52 Inode access rights
55 All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it.
64 File descriptor access rights
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| /linux-6.6.21/Documentation/core-api/ ! |
| D | unaligned-memory-access.rst | 14 when it comes to memory access. This document presents some details about
19 The definition of an unaligned access
26 access.
28 The above may seem a little vague, as memory access can happen in different
32 which will compile to multiple-byte memory access instructions, namely when
47 of memory access. However, we must consider ALL supported architectures;
52 Why unaligned access is bad
55 The effects of performing an unaligned memory access vary from architecture
62 happen. The exception handler is able to correct the unaligned access,
66 unaligned access to be corrected.
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| /linux-6.6.21/Documentation/arch/arm/ ! |
| D | mem_alignment.rst | 5 Too many problems popped up because of unnoticed misaligned memory access in
14 unaligned memory access in general. If those access are predictable, you
16 alignment trap can fixup misaligned access for the exception cases, but at
20 trap to SIGBUS any code performing unaligned access (good for debugging bad
21 code), or even fixup the access by software like for kernel code. The later
36 0 A user process performing an unaligned memory access
42 performing the unaligned access. This is of course
47 performing the unaligned access.
59 information on unaligned access occurrences plus the current mode of
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/dax/ ! |
| D | Kconfig | 3 tristate "DAX: direct access to differentiated memory"
9 tristate "Device DAX: direct access mapping device"
12 Support raw access to differentiated (persistence, bandwidth,
20 tristate "PMEM DAX: direct access to persistent memory"
24 Support raw access to persistent memory. Note that this
31 tristate "HMEM DAX: direct access to 'specific purpose' memory"
48 tristate "CXL DAX: direct access to CXL RAM regions"
56 instance is created to access that unmapped-by-default address range.
57 Per usual it can remain as dedicated access via a device interface, or
70 Support access to persistent, or other performance
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/ ! |
| D | sja1105_dynamic_config.c | 886 .access = OP_WRITE,
894 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
902 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_VALID_ANYWAY),
910 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
919 .access = OP_WRITE,
927 .access = OP_WRITE,
935 .access = OP_WRITE,
943 .access = OP_WRITE,
951 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
959 .access = OP_WRITE,
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| /linux-6.6.21/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ ! |
| D | dev_cgroup.c | 17 short access = ctx->access_type >> 16; in bpf_prog1() local
32 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_READ) in bpf_prog1()
35 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in bpf_prog1()
38 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in bpf_prog1()
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| /linux-6.6.21/tools/perf/Documentation/ ! |
| D | security.txt | 8 Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
11 LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
13 Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
127 Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
133 and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
139 Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
141 more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
143 access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
148 >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149 >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
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| /linux-6.6.21/arch/arm64/include/asm/ ! |
| D | arch_timer.h | 100 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u64 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
102 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
114 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
132 u64 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
134 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
141 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
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| /linux-6.6.21/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/ ! |
| D | paging_tmpl.h | 109 static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, in FNAME()
124 *access &= mask; in FNAME()
181 unsigned access; in FNAME() local
183 access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) | in FNAME()
189 access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK); in FNAME()
191 access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT); in FNAME()
194 return access; in FNAME()
304 gpa_t addr, u64 access) in FNAME()
317 const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; in FNAME()
318 const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK; in FNAME()
[all …]
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| /linux-6.6.21/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ ! |
| D | zl6100.c | 25 ktime_t access; /* chip access time */ member
129 s64 delta = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), data->access); in zl6100_wait()
179 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_word_data()
228 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_byte_data()
270 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_word_data()
286 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_byte()
372 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
407 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
421 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
431 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
[all …]
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| /linux-6.6.21/fs/nfsd/ ! |
| D | lockd.c | 32 int access; in nlm_fopen() local
41 access = (mode == O_WRONLY) ? NFSD_MAY_WRITE : NFSD_MAY_READ; in nlm_fopen()
42 access |= NFSD_MAY_LOCK; in nlm_fopen()
43 nfserr = nfsd_open(rqstp, &fh, S_IFREG, access, filp); in nlm_fopen()
|