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/linux-6.1.9/security/
Ddevice_cgroup.c38 short access; member
118 walk->access |= ex->access; in dev_exception_add()
146 walk->access &= ~ex->access; in dev_exception_rm()
147 if (!walk->access) { in dev_exception_rm()
250 static void set_access(char *acc, short access) in set_access() argument
254 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) in set_access()
256 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in set_access()
258 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in set_access()
302 set_access(acc, ex->access); in devcgroup_seq_show()
328 u32 major, u32 minor, short access) in match_exception() argument
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/linux-6.1.9/sound/core/
Dcontrol_led.c49 unsigned int access; member
81 static inline unsigned int access_to_group(unsigned int access) in access_to_group() argument
83 return ((access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_LED_MASK) >> in access_to_group()
92 static struct snd_ctl_led *snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access() argument
94 unsigned int group = access_to_group(access); in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access()
137 static void snd_ctl_led_set_state(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int access, in snd_ctl_led_set_state() argument
145 led = snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(access); in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
165 lctl->access = access; in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
199 unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_remove() argument
206 if (lctl && (access == 0 || access != lctl->access)) { in snd_ctl_led_remove()
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/linux-6.1.9/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/
DSmack.rst10 Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access
33 access to systems that use them as Smack does.
50 load the Smack access rules
53 report if a process with one label has access
85 Used to make access control decisions. In almost all cases
95 label does not allow all of the access permitted to a process
102 the Smack rule (more below) that permitted the write access
110 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
115 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
131 access
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/linux-6.1.9/drivers/platform/chrome/
Dcros_ec_lpc_mec.c79 enum cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_access_mode access, new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec() local
91 access = ACCESS_TYPE_BYTE; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
93 access = ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
98 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
126 if (new_access != access || in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
127 access != ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT) { in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
128 access = new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
129 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
/linux-6.1.9/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/
Dfs_test.c431 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
452 for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
453 path_beneath_dir.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
458 path_beneath_file.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
461 if (access & ACCESS_FILE) { in TEST_F_FORK()
514 __u64 access; member
555 add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access, in create_ruleset()
576 .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | in TEST_F_FORK()
583 _metadata, rules[0].access | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, in TEST_F_FORK()
625 .access = ACCESS_RO, in TEST_F_FORK()
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/linux-6.1.9/kernel/kcsan/
Dkcsan_test.c152 } access[2]; member
159 const bool is_assert = (r->access[0].type | r->access[1].type) & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT; in __report_matches()
182 if (r->access[1].fn) { in __report_matches()
187 scnprintf(tmp[0], sizeof(tmp[0]), "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
188 scnprintf(tmp[1], sizeof(tmp[1]), "%pS", r->access[1].fn); in __report_matches()
191 cmp < 0 ? r->access[0].fn : r->access[1].fn, in __report_matches()
192 cmp < 0 ? r->access[1].fn : r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
194 scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
204 if (!r->access[1].fn) in __report_matches()
209 const int ty = r->access[i].type; in __report_matches()
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/linux-6.1.9/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/dma/
Duser.c87 args->v0.version, args->v0.target, args->v0.access, in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
90 dmaobj->access = args->v0.access; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
120 switch (dmaobj->access) { in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
122 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_VM; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
125 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
128 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_WO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
131 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RW; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
/linux-6.1.9/include/linux/
Ddevice_cgroup.h16 short access);
19 short type, access = 0; in devcgroup_inode_permission() local
32 access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
34 access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
37 access); in devcgroup_inode_permission()
61 short access) in devcgroup_check_permission() argument
/linux-6.1.9/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/
Drxe_mr.c51 static void rxe_mr_init(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init() argument
54 u32 rkey = (access & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE) ? lkey : 0; in rxe_mr_init()
107 void rxe_mr_init_dma(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_dma() argument
109 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_dma()
111 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init_dma()
117 int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_user() argument
127 umem = ib_umem_get(&rxe->ib_dev, start, length, access); in rxe_mr_init_user()
137 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_user()
177 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init_user()
366 int access, in copy_data() argument
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Drxe_mw.c61 if (unlikely((mw->access & IB_ZERO_BASED))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
94 if (unlikely(mr->access & IB_ZERO_BASED)) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
100 if (unlikely(!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
107 if (unlikely((mw->access & in rxe_check_bind_mw()
109 !(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
116 if (mw->access & IB_ZERO_BASED) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
141 mw->access = wqe->wr.wr.mw.access; in rxe_do_bind_mw()
245 mw->access = 0; in rxe_do_invalidate_mw()
283 struct rxe_mw *rxe_lookup_mw(struct rxe_qp *qp, int access, u32 rkey) in rxe_lookup_mw() argument
297 (access && !(access & mw->access)) || in rxe_lookup_mw()
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/linux-6.1.9/arch/arm/include/asm/
Darch_timer.h28 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u64 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
30 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
42 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
60 u32 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
64 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
72 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
/linux-6.1.9/fs/afs/
Dsecurity.c131 h += permits->permits[i].access; in afs_hash_permits()
168 if (permits->permits[i].access != caller_access) { in afs_cache_permit()
233 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
237 new->permits[j].access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_cache_permit()
244 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
327 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit_rcu()
367 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit()
402 afs_access_t access; in afs_permission() local
416 !afs_check_permit_rcu(vnode, key, &access)) in afs_permission()
430 ret = afs_check_permit(vnode, key, &access); in afs_permission()
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/linux-6.1.9/Documentation/core-api/
Dunaligned-memory-access.rst14 when it comes to memory access. This document presents some details about
19 The definition of an unaligned access
26 access.
28 The above may seem a little vague, as memory access can happen in different
32 which will compile to multiple-byte memory access instructions, namely when
47 of memory access. However, we must consider ALL supported architectures;
52 Why unaligned access is bad
55 The effects of performing an unaligned memory access vary from architecture
62 happen. The exception handler is able to correct the unaligned access,
66 unaligned access to be corrected.
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/linux-6.1.9/Documentation/arm/
Dmem_alignment.rst5 Too many problems popped up because of unnoticed misaligned memory access in
14 unaligned memory access in general. If those access are predictable, you
16 alignment trap can fixup misaligned access for the exception cases, but at
20 trap to SIGBUS any code performing unaligned access (good for debugging bad
21 code), or even fixup the access by software like for kernel code. The later
36 0 A user process performing an unaligned memory access
42 performing the unaligned access. This is of course
47 performing the unaligned access.
59 information on unaligned access occurrences plus the current mode of
/linux-6.1.9/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/
Dsja1105_dynamic_config.c886 .access = OP_WRITE,
894 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
902 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_VALID_ANYWAY),
910 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
919 .access = OP_WRITE,
927 .access = OP_WRITE,
935 .access = OP_WRITE,
943 .access = OP_WRITE,
951 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
959 .access = OP_WRITE,
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/linux-6.1.9/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/
Ddev_cgroup.c17 short access = ctx->access_type >> 16; in bpf_prog1() local
32 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_READ) in bpf_prog1()
35 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in bpf_prog1()
38 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in bpf_prog1()
/linux-6.1.9/tools/perf/Documentation/
Dsecurity.txt8 Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
11 LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
13 Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
127 Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
133 and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
139 Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
141 more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
143 access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
148 >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149 >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
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/linux-6.1.9/arch/arm64/include/asm/
Darch_timer.h106 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u64 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
108 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
120 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
138 u64 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
140 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
147 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
/linux-6.1.9/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/
Dzl6100.c25 ktime_t access; /* chip access time */ member
129 s64 delta = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), data->access); in zl6100_wait()
179 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_word_data()
228 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_byte_data()
270 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_word_data()
286 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_byte()
372 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
407 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
421 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
431 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
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Dmax15301.c34 ktime_t access; /* Chip access time */ member
62 s64 delta = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), data->access); in max15301_wait()
84 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_read_word_data()
100 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_read_byte_data()
120 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_write_word_data()
136 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_write_byte()
/linux-6.1.9/Documentation/security/
Dlandlock.rst12 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
20 system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
21 LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
31 Guiding principles for safe access controls
34 * A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
40 * Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
48 Filesystem access rights
51 All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it.
88 grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the
/linux-6.1.9/drivers/dax/
DKconfig3 tristate "DAX: direct access to differentiated memory"
10 tristate "Device DAX: direct access mapping device"
13 Support raw access to differentiated (persistence, bandwidth,
21 tristate "PMEM DAX: direct access to persistent memory"
25 Support raw access to persistent memory. Note that this
32 tristate "HMEM DAX: direct access to 'specific purpose' memory"
58 Support access to persistent, or other performance
/linux-6.1.9/fs/nfsd/
Dlockd.c32 int access; in nlm_fopen() local
41 access = (mode == O_WRONLY) ? NFSD_MAY_WRITE : NFSD_MAY_READ; in nlm_fopen()
42 access |= NFSD_MAY_LOCK; in nlm_fopen()
43 nfserr = nfsd_open(rqstp, &fh, S_IFREG, access, filp); in nlm_fopen()
/linux-6.1.9/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/
Dpaging_tmpl.h109 static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, in FNAME()
124 *access &= mask; in FNAME()
181 unsigned access; in FNAME() local
183 access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) | in FNAME()
189 access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK); in FNAME()
191 access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT); in FNAME()
194 return access; in FNAME()
304 gpa_t addr, u64 access) in FNAME()
317 const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; in FNAME()
318 const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK; in FNAME()
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/linux-6.1.9/Documentation/userspace-api/
Dlandlock.rst7 Landlock: unprivileged access control
14 filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
16 in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
32 file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access
44 the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
72 remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` access right which is only supported
129 for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
133 We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
169 It is recommended setting access rights to file hierarchy leaves as much as
176 access rights per directory enables to change the location of such directory
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