/linux-2.6.39/fs/ecryptfs/ |
D | debug.c | 43 ecryptfs_to_hex(salt, auth_tok->token.password.salt, in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok() 47 if (auth_tok->token.password.flags & in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok() 51 memcpy(sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature, in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok()
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D | keystore.c | 746 (u8 *)s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet() 747 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet() 767 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet() 846 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet() 854 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet() 1056 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, in ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() 1064 s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, in ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() 1130 (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature; in ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig() 1489 memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->token.password.salt, in parse_tag_3_packet() 1493 (*new_auth_tok)->token.password.hash_iterations = in parse_tag_3_packet() [all …]
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D | ecryptfs_kernel.h | 153 struct ecryptfs_password password; member
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/linux-2.6.39/fs/cifs/ |
D | misc.c | 99 if (buf_to_free->password) { in sesInfoFree() 100 memset(buf_to_free->password, 0, strlen(buf_to_free->password)); in sesInfoFree() 101 kfree(buf_to_free->password); in sesInfoFree() 135 if (buf_to_free->password) { in tconInfoFree() 136 memset(buf_to_free->password, 0, strlen(buf_to_free->password)); in tconInfoFree() 137 kfree(buf_to_free->password); in tconInfoFree()
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D | connect.c | 62 char *password; member 906 vol->password = NULL; in cifs_parse_mount_options() 914 vol->password = NULL; in cifs_parse_mount_options() 962 vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL); in cifs_parse_mount_options() 963 if (vol->password == NULL) { in cifs_parse_mount_options() 969 vol->password[j] = value[i]; in cifs_parse_mount_options() 976 vol->password[j] = 0; in cifs_parse_mount_options() 978 vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL); in cifs_parse_mount_options() 979 if (vol->password == NULL) { in cifs_parse_mount_options() 984 strcpy(vol->password, value); in cifs_parse_mount_options() [all …]
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D | README | 203 pass=<password> 226 password=your_password 227 2) By specifying the password in the PASSWD environment variable (similarly 229 3) By specifying the password in a file by name via PASSWD_FILE 230 4) By specifying the password in a file by file descriptor via PASSWD_FD 232 If no password is provided, mount.cifs will prompt for password entry 257 password The user password. If the mount helper is 258 installed, the user will be prompted for password 357 -o user=myname,password=mypassword,domain=mydom 359 -o sep=.user=myname.password=mypassword.domain=mydom [all …]
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D | cifsencrypt.c | 248 rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey, in setup_ntlm_response() 256 rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key); in setup_ntlm_response() 271 void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt, in calc_lanman_hash() argument 278 if (password) in calc_lanman_hash() 279 strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); in calc_lanman_hash() 464 E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash); in calc_ntlmv2_hash()
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D | cifsglob.h | 279 char *password; member 303 char *password; /* for share-level security */ member
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D | CHANGES | 116 on dns_upcall (resolving DFS referralls). Fix plain text password 245 (win9x, os/2 etc.) when null password. Do not send listxattr 257 NTLMv2 authentication support (now can use stronger password hashing 298 directio. Recognize share mode security and send NTLM encrypted password 433 from Samba server to DC (Samba required dummy LM password). 558 Fix PPC64 build error. Reduce excessive stack usage in smb password 634 Allow passwords longer than 16 bytes. Allow null password string. 671 Fix unsafe global variable usage and password hash failure on gcc 3.3.1 874 Fix temporary socket leak when bad userid or password specified 1051 5) Removed logging of password field.
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D | cifsproto.h | 386 extern void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey,
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D | Kconfig | 56 security mechanisms. These hash the password more securely
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D | sess.c | 659 calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey, in CIFS_SessSetup()
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/linux-2.6.39/sound/isa/opti9xx/ |
D | opti92x-ad1848.c | 130 unsigned char password; member 233 chip->password = (hardware == OPTi9XX_HW_82C928) ? 0xe2 : 0xe3; in snd_opti9xx_init() 239 chip->password = 0xe5; in snd_opti9xx_init() 252 chip->password = 0xe4; in snd_opti9xx_init() 271 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_read() 279 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_read() 294 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_read() 313 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_write() 321 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_write() 336 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_opti9xx_write() [all …]
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D | miro.c | 108 unsigned char password; member 818 chip->password = 0xe3; in snd_miro_init() 822 chip->password = 0xe5; in snd_miro_init() 840 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_miro_read() 846 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_miro_read() 869 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_miro_write() 875 outb(chip->password, chip->mc_base + chip->pwd_reg); in snd_miro_write()
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/scsi/ |
D | arcmsr_spec.txt | 131 ** no password checking is needed and should be implemented in separate 133 ** Command code 0x20--0x?? always check the password, 134 ** password must be entered to enable these command. 185 ** byte 3 : password length (should be 0x0f) 191 ** byte 3 : password length (should be 0x08) 197 ** byte 3 : password length (should be 0x08) 204 ** GUI_CHECK_PASSWORD : Verify password 207 ** byte 3 : password length 208 ** byte 4-0x?? : user password to be checked 209 ** GUI_LOGOUT : Logout GUI (force password checking on next command) [all …]
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/ABI/testing/ |
D | sysfs-ibft | 15 contain the CHAP name (and password), the reverse CHAP 16 name (and password)
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/filesystems/ |
D | cifs.txt | 35 user=username,pass=password,unc=//ip_address_of_server/sharename 38 mount //ip_address_of_server/sharename /mnt_target -o user=username, pass=password
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D | afs.txt | 203 Currently the username, realm, password and proposed ticket lifetime are
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/i2c/busses/ |
D | i2c-ali15x3 | 63 full data sheets on the web site are password protected, however if you 64 contact the ALI office in San Jose they may give you the password.
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/linux-2.6.39/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/ |
D | cmm_wpa.c | 1333 static void F(char *password, unsigned char *ssid, int ssidlength, in F() argument 1345 …HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char *)password, (int)strlen(password), digest, ssidlength + 4, digest1, SHA1_… in F() 1352 …HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char *)password, (int)strlen(password), digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, SHA… in F() 1368 int PasswordHash(char *password, u8 *ssid, int ssidlength, u8 *output) in PasswordHash() argument 1370 if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32)) in PasswordHash() 1373 F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output); in PasswordHash() 1374 F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2, &output[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]); in PasswordHash()
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/linux-2.6.39/drivers/staging/rt2860/ |
D | wpa.h | 377 int PasswordHash(char *password,
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/ |
D | SAK.txt | 5 provided as protection against trojan password capturing programs. It
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/linux-2.6.39/include/scsi/ |
D | libiscsi.h | 284 char *password; member
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/networking/ |
D | s2io.txt | 145 user: linuxdocs password: HALdocs
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/linux-2.6.39/Documentation/crypto/ |
D | descore-readme.txt | 57 and password cracking, i haven't really bothered yet to speed up 90 password-cracking applications, he also used the same ideas to
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