xref: /linux-2.4.37.9/drivers/char/random.c

/*
 * random.c -- A strong random number generator
 *
 * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
 *
 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.  All
 * rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
 *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
 *    products derived from this software without specific prior
 *    written permission.
 *
 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 * DAMAGE.
 */

/*
 * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
 *
 * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
 * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
 * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
 * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
 * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
 * predict by an attacker.
 *
 * Theory of operation
 * ===================
 *
 * Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
 * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
 * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
 * algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
 * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
 * applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
 * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
 * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
 * generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
 * from inside the kernel.
 *
 * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
 * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
 * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
 * outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
 * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
 * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
 * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
 * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
 * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
 * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
 * the random number generator's internal state.
 *
 * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
 * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool".  The SHA hash avoids
 * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool.  It is believed to
 * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
 * about the input of SHA from its output.  Even if it is possible to
 * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
 * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
 * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable.  For this
 * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
 * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
 * outputs random numbers.
 *
 * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
 * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
 * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
 * outputs.  This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
 * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
 * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
 * of purposes.
 *
 * Exported interfaces ---- output
 * ===============================
 *
 * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
 * be used from within the kernel:
 *
 * 	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 *
 * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
 * and place it in the requested buffer.
 *
 * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
 * /dev/urandom.  /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
 * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
 * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
 * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
 * contained in the entropy pool.
 *
 * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
 * as many bytes as are requested.  As more and more random bytes are
 * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
 * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
 * strong.  For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
 *
 * Exported interfaces ---- input
 * ==============================
 *
 * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
 * from the devices are:
 *
 * 	void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
 * 	void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data);
 * 	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
 * 	void add_blkdev_randomness(int irq);
 *
 * add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
 * scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
 *
 * add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as
 * the reported position of the mouse from the hardware.
 *
 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
 * inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
 * sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
 * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
 * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Disk interrupts are
 * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
 * unpredictable.
 *
 * add_blkdev_randomness() times the finishing time of block requests.
 *
 * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
 * particular randomness source.  They do this by keeping track of the
 * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
 *
 * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
 * ============================================
 *
 * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
 * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
 * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
 * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
 * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count.  In order to
 * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
 * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups.  To do this, put the
 * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
 * sequence:
 *
 *	echo "Initializing random number generator..."
 *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
 *	# Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
 *	# Load and then save the whole entropy pool
 *	if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
 *		cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
 *	else
 *		touch $random_seed
 *	fi
 *	chmod 600 $random_seed
 *	poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
 *	[ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
 *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
 *
 * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
 * the system is shutdown:
 *
 *	# Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
 *	# Save the whole entropy pool
 *	echo "Saving random seed..."
 *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
 *	touch $random_seed
 *	chmod 600 $random_seed
 *	poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
 *	[ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
 *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
 *
 * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
 * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
 * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random.  On older Linux systems, the correct script
 * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
 *
 * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
 * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
 * start-up.  (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
 * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
 * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.)  Even with
 * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
 * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
 * the system.
 *
 * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
 * ==============================================
 *
 * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
 * the /dev/mem major number (#1).  So if your system does not have
 * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
 * by using the commands:
 *
 * 	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
 * 	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
 *
 * Acknowledgements:
 * =================
 *
 * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
 * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
 * discussions with Phil Karn.  Colin Plumb provided a faster random
 * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
 * pool, taken from PGPfone.  Dale Worley has also contributed many
 * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
 *
 * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
 * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
 *
 * The code for SHA transform was taken from Peter Gutmann's
 * implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
 * The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
 * implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
 * The MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
 * documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
 *
 * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
 * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
 * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
 */

#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>

#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/io.h>

/*
 * Configuration information
 */
#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
#define USE_SHA

/*
 * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
 * /dev/random.  Should always be at least 8, or at least 1 byte.
 */
static int random_read_wakeup_thresh = 8;

/*
 * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
 * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
 * access to /dev/random.
 */
static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;

/*
 * A pool of size .poolwords is stirred with a primitive polynomial
 * of degree .poolwords over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are
 * defined below.  They are chosen to be evenly spaced (minimum RMS
 * distance from evenly spaced; the numbers in the comments are a
 * scaled squared error sum) except for the last tap, which is 1 to
 * get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
 */
static struct poolinfo {
	int	poolwords;
	int	tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
} poolinfo_table[] = {
	/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1  -- 115 */
	{ 2048,	1638,	1231,	819,	411,	1 },

	/* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
	{ 1024,	817,	615,	412,	204,	1 },
#if 0				/* Alternate polynomial */
	/* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
	{ 1024,	819,	616,	410,	207,	2 },
#endif

	/* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
	{ 512,	411,	308,	208,	104,	1 },
#if 0				/* Alternates */
	/* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
	{ 512,	409,	307,	206,	102,	2 },
	/* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
	{ 512,	409,	309,	205,	103,	2 },
#endif

	/* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
	{ 256,	205,	155,	101,	52,	1 },

	/* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
	{ 128,	103,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
#if 0	/* Alternate polynomial */
	/* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
	{ 128,	103,	78,	51,	27,	2 },
#endif

	/* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
	{ 64,	52,	39,	26,	14,	1 },

	/* x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 -- 15 */
	{ 32,	26,	20,	14,	7,	1 },

	{ 0,	0,	0,	0,	0,	0 },
};

#define POOLBITS	poolwords*32
#define POOLBYTES	poolwords*4

/*
 * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
 * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Reigster
 *
 * (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR generators.  ACM
 * Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194.
 * Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted GFSR generators
 * II.  ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
 *
 * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
 *
 * We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
 * in fact it almost certainly isn't.  Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
 * of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
 * that periodicity is not a concern.
 *
 * The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash.  All
 * that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
 * i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
 * we expect to see.  As long as the pool state differs for different
 * inputs, we have preserved the input entropy and done a good job.
 * The fact that an intelligent attacker can construct inputs that
 * will produce controlled alterations to the pool's state is not
 * important because we don't consider such inputs to contribute any
 * randomness.  The only property we need with respect to them is that
 * the attacker can't increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.
 * Since all additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the
 * input, you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has
 * any uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle
 * that uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
 * decrease the uncertainty).
 *
 * The chosen system lets the state of the pool be (essentially) the input
 * modulo the generator polymnomial.  Now, for random primitive polynomials,
 * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
 * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
 * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
 * a collision.  Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
 * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
 * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
 * hash; hash collisions will occur no more often than chance.
 */

/*
 * Linux 2.2 compatibility
 */
#ifndef DECLARE_WAITQUEUE
#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR)	struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
#endif
#ifndef DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD
#define DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(WAIT) struct wait_queue *WAIT
#endif

/*
 * Static global variables
 */
static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);

/*
 * Forward procedure declarations
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state);
#endif

/*****************************************************************
 *
 * Utility functions, with some ASM defined functions for speed
 * purposes
 *
 *****************************************************************/

/*
 * Unfortunately, while the GCC optimizer for the i386 understands how
 * to optimize a static rotate left of x bits, it doesn't know how to
 * deal with a variable rotate of x bits.  So we use a bit of asm magic.
 */
#if (!defined (__i386__))
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
	return (word << i) | (word >> (32 - i));

}
#else
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
	__asm__("roll %%cl,%0"
		:"=r" (word)
		:"0" (word),"c" (i));
	return word;
}
#endif

/*
 * More asm magic....
 *
 * For entropy estimation, we need to do an integral base 2
 * logarithm.
 *
 * Note the "12bits" suffix - this is used for numbers between
 * 0 and 4095 only.  This allows a few shortcuts.
 */
#if 0	/* Slow but clear version */
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
	__u32 nbits = 0;

	while (word >>= 1)
		nbits++;
	return nbits;
}
#else	/* Faster (more clever) version, courtesy Colin Plumb */
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
	/* Smear msbit right to make an n-bit mask */
	word |= word >> 8;
	word |= word >> 4;
	word |= word >> 2;
	word |= word >> 1;
	/* Remove one bit to make this a logarithm */
	word >>= 1;
	/* Count the bits set in the word */
	word -= (word >> 1) & 0x555;
	word = (word & 0x333) + ((word >> 2) & 0x333);
	word += (word >> 4);
	word += (word >> 8);
	return word & 15;
}
#endif

#if 0
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "random: " fmt, ## arg)
#else
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
#endif

/**********************************************************************
 *
 * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
 * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
 *
 **********************************************************************/

struct entropy_store {
	unsigned	add_ptr;
	int		entropy_count;
	int		input_rotate;
	int		extract_count;
	struct poolinfo poolinfo;
	__u32		*pool;
};

/*
 * Initialize the entropy store.  The input argument is the size of
 * the random pool.
 *
 * Returns an negative error if there is a problem.
 */
static int create_entropy_store(int size, struct entropy_store **ret_bucket)
{
	struct	entropy_store	*r;
	struct	poolinfo	*p;
	int	poolwords;

	poolwords = (size + 3) / 4; /* Convert bytes->words */
	/* The pool size must be a multiple of 16 32-bit words */
	poolwords = ((poolwords + 15) / 16) * 16;

	for (p = poolinfo_table; p->poolwords; p++) {
		if (poolwords == p->poolwords)
			break;
	}
	if (p->poolwords == 0)
		return -EINVAL;

	r = kmalloc(sizeof(struct entropy_store), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!r)
		return -ENOMEM;

	memset (r, 0, sizeof(struct entropy_store));
	r->poolinfo = *p;

	r->pool = kmalloc(POOLBYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!r->pool) {
		kfree(r);
		return -ENOMEM;
	}
	memset(r->pool, 0, POOLBYTES);
	*ret_bucket = r;
	return 0;
}

/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. */
static void clear_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
{
	r->add_ptr = 0;
	r->entropy_count = 0;
	r->input_rotate = 0;
	r->extract_count = 0;
	memset(r->pool, 0, r->poolinfo.POOLBYTES);
}

static void free_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
{
	if (r->pool)
		kfree(r->pool);
	kfree(r);
}

/*
 * This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool".  It does not
 * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
 * credit_entropy_store if this is appropriate.
 *
 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
 * degree, and then twisted.  We twist by three bits at a time because
 * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
 * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
 */
static void add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
			      int nwords)
{
	static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
		         0, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
		0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
	unsigned i;
	int new_rotate;
	int wordmask = r->poolinfo.poolwords - 1;
	__u32 w;

	while (nwords--) {
		w = rotate_left(r->input_rotate, *in++);
		i = r->add_ptr = (r->add_ptr - 1) & wordmask;
		/*
		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
		 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
		 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
		 * input bits across the pool evenly.
		 */
		new_rotate = r->input_rotate + 14;
		if (i)
			new_rotate = r->input_rotate + 7;
		r->input_rotate = new_rotate & 31;

		/* XOR in the various taps */
		w ^= r->pool[(i + r->poolinfo.tap1) & wordmask];
		w ^= r->pool[(i + r->poolinfo.tap2) & wordmask];
		w ^= r->pool[(i + r->poolinfo.tap3) & wordmask];
		w ^= r->pool[(i + r->poolinfo.tap4) & wordmask];
		w ^= r->pool[(i + r->poolinfo.tap5) & wordmask];
		w ^= r->pool[i];
		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
	}
}

/*
 * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
 */
static void credit_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
{
	if (r->entropy_count + nbits < 0) {
		DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow (%d+%d)\n",
			  r->entropy_count, nbits);
		r->entropy_count = 0;
	} else if (r->entropy_count + nbits > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS) {
		r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
	} else {
		r->entropy_count += nbits;
		if (nbits)
			DEBUG_ENT("%s added %d bits, now %d\n",
				  r == sec_random_state ? "secondary" :
				  r == random_state ? "primary" : "unknown",
				  nbits, r->entropy_count);
	}
}

/**********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy batch input management
 *
 * We batch entropy to be added to avoid increasing interrupt latency
 *
 **********************************************************************/

static __u32	*batch_entropy_pool;
static int	*batch_entropy_credit;
static int	batch_max;
static int	batch_head, batch_tail;
static struct tq_struct	batch_tqueue;
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_);

/* note: the size must be a power of 2 */
static int __init batch_entropy_init(int size, struct entropy_store *r)
{
	batch_entropy_pool = kmalloc(2*size*sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!batch_entropy_pool)
		return -1;
	batch_entropy_credit =kmalloc(size*sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!batch_entropy_credit) {
		kfree(batch_entropy_pool);
		return -1;
	}
	batch_head = batch_tail = 0;
	batch_max = size;
	batch_tqueue.routine = batch_entropy_process;
	batch_tqueue.data = r;
	return 0;
}

/*
 * Changes to the entropy data is put into a queue rather than being added to
 * the entropy counts directly.  This is presumably to avoid doing heavy
 * hashing calculations during an interrupt in add_timer_randomness().
 * Instead, the entropy is only added to the pool once per timer tick.
 */
void batch_entropy_store(u32 a, u32 b, int num)
{
	int	new;

	if (!batch_max)
		return;

	batch_entropy_pool[2*batch_head] = a;
	batch_entropy_pool[(2*batch_head) + 1] = b;
	batch_entropy_credit[batch_head] = num;

	new = (batch_head+1) & (batch_max-1);
	if (new != batch_tail) {
		queue_task(&batch_tqueue, &tq_timer);
		batch_head = new;
	} else {
		DEBUG_ENT("batch entropy buffer full\n");
	}
}

/*
 * Flush out the accumulated entropy operations, adding entropy to the passed
 * store (normally random_state).  If that store has enough entropy, alternate
 * between randomizing the data of the primary and secondary stores.
 */
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_)
{
	struct entropy_store *r	= (struct entropy_store *) private_, *p;
	int max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;

	if (!batch_max)
		return;

	p = r;
	while (batch_head != batch_tail) {
		if (r->entropy_count >= max_entropy) {
			r = (r == sec_random_state) ?	random_state :
							sec_random_state;
			max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
		}
		add_entropy_words(r, batch_entropy_pool + 2*batch_tail, 2);
		credit_entropy_store(r, batch_entropy_credit[batch_tail]);
		batch_tail = (batch_tail+1) & (batch_max-1);
	}
	if (p->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
		wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
}

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy input management
 *
 *********************************************************************/

/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
	__u32		last_time;
	__s32		last_delta,last_delta2;
	int		dont_count_entropy:1;
};

static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state mouse_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state;
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_S390
static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
#endif
static struct timer_rand_state *blkdev_timer_state[MAX_BLKDEV];

/*
 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
 * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
 *
 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
 * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
 * On the i386, this is assumed to be at most 16 bits, and the high bits
 * are used for a high-resolution timer.
 *
 */
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
{
	__u32		time;
	__s32		delta, delta2, delta3;
	int		entropy = 0;

#if defined (__i386__)
	if (cpu_has_tsc) {
		__u32 high;
		rdtsc(time, high);
		num ^= high;
	} else {
		time = jiffies;
	}
#elif defined (__x86_64__)
	__u32 high;
	rdtsc(time, high);
	num ^= high;
#elif defined (__sparc_v9__)
	unsigned long tick = tick_ops->get_tick();

	time = (unsigned int) tick;
	num ^= (tick >> 32UL);
#else
	time = jiffies;
#endif

	/*
	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
	 * in order to make our estimate.
	 */
	if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
		delta = time - state->last_time;
		state->last_time = time;

		delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
		state->last_delta = delta;

		delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
		state->last_delta2 = delta2;

		if (delta < 0)
			delta = -delta;
		if (delta2 < 0)
			delta2 = -delta2;
		if (delta3 < 0)
			delta3 = -delta3;
		if (delta > delta2)
			delta = delta2;
		if (delta > delta3)
			delta = delta3;

		/*
		 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
		 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
		 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
		 */
		delta >>= 1;
		delta &= (1 << 12) - 1;

		entropy = int_ln_12bits(delta);
	}
	batch_entropy_store(num, time, entropy);
}

#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_S390
void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode)
{
	static unsigned char last_scancode;
	/* ignore autorepeat (multiple key down w/o key up) */
	if (scancode != last_scancode) {
		last_scancode = scancode;
		add_timer_randomness(&keyboard_timer_state, scancode);
	}
}

void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data)
{
	add_timer_randomness(&mouse_timer_state, mouse_data);
}

void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
	if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == 0)
		return;

	add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100+irq);
}
#endif

void add_blkdev_randomness(int major)
{
	if (major >= MAX_BLKDEV)
		return;

	if (blkdev_timer_state[major] == 0) {
		rand_initialize_blkdev(major, GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (blkdev_timer_state[major] == 0)
			return;
	}

	add_timer_randomness(blkdev_timer_state[major], 0x200+major);
}

/******************************************************************
 *
 * Hash function definition
 *
 *******************************************************************/

/*
 * This chunk of code defines a function
 * void HASH_TRANSFORM(__u32 digest[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE],
 * 		__u32 const data[16])
 *
 * The function hashes the input data to produce a digest in the first
 * HASH_BUFFER_SIZE words of the digest[] array, and uses HASH_EXTRA_SIZE
 * more words for internal purposes.  (This buffer is exported so the
 * caller can wipe it once rather than this code doing it each call,
 * and tacking it onto the end of the digest[] array is the quick and
 * dirty way of doing it.)
 *
 * It so happens that MD5 and SHA share most of the initial vector
 * used to initialize the digest[] array before the first call:
 * 1) 0x67452301
 * 2) 0xefcdab89
 * 3) 0x98badcfe
 * 4) 0x10325476
 * 5) 0xc3d2e1f0 (SHA only)
 *
 * For /dev/random purposes, the length of the data being hashed is
 * fixed in length, so appending a bit count in the usual way is not
 * cryptographically necessary.
 */

#ifdef USE_SHA

#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 5
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 80
#define HASH_TRANSFORM SHATransform

/* Various size/speed tradeoffs are available.  Choose 0..3. */
#define SHA_CODE_SIZE 0

/*
 * SHA transform algorithm, taken from code written by Peter Gutmann,
 * and placed in the public domain.
 */

/* The SHA f()-functions.  */

#define f1(x,y,z)   ( z ^ (x & (y^z)) )		/* Rounds  0-19: x ? y : z */
#define f2(x,y,z)   (x ^ y ^ z)			/* Rounds 20-39: XOR */
#define f3(x,y,z)   ( (x & y) + (z & (x ^ y)) )	/* Rounds 40-59: majority */
#define f4(x,y,z)   (x ^ y ^ z)			/* Rounds 60-79: XOR */

/* The SHA Mysterious Constants */

#define K1  0x5A827999L			/* Rounds  0-19: sqrt(2) * 2^30 */
#define K2  0x6ED9EBA1L			/* Rounds 20-39: sqrt(3) * 2^30 */
#define K3  0x8F1BBCDCL			/* Rounds 40-59: sqrt(5) * 2^30 */
#define K4  0xCA62C1D6L			/* Rounds 60-79: sqrt(10) * 2^30 */

#define ROTL(n,X)  ( ( ( X ) << n ) | ( ( X ) >> ( 32 - n ) ) )

#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, k, data) \
    ( e += ROTL( 5, a ) + f( b, c, d ) + k + data, b = ROTL( 30, b ) )


static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
{
    __u32 A, B, C, D, E;     /* Local vars */
    __u32 TEMP;
    int	i;
#define W (digest + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE)	/* Expanded data array */

    /*
     * Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words.  Doing it
     * out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
     * register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
     * slower on real processors.
     */
    memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
	    TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
	    W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
    }

    /* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
    A = digest[ 0 ];
    B = digest[ 1 ];
    C = digest[ 2 ];
    D = digest[ 3 ];
    E = digest[ 4 ];

    /* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
#if SHA_CODE_SIZE == 0
    /*
     * Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
     * takes up 1/16 the space.  Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
	if (i < 40) {
	    if (i < 20)
		TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
	    else
		TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
	} else {
	    if (i < 60)
		TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
	    else
		TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
	}
	TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
	E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 1
    for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
	TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
	E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 40; i++) {
	TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
	E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 60; i++) {
	TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
	E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 80; i++) {
	TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
	E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 2
    for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
	subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ i   ] );
	subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ i+1 ] );
	subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ i+2 ] );
	subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ i+3 ] );
	subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
	subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ i   ] );
	subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ i+1 ] );
	subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ i+2 ] );
	subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ i+3 ] );
	subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
	subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ i   ] );
	subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ i+1 ] );
	subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ i+2 ] );
	subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ i+3 ] );
	subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
	subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ i   ] );
	subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ i+1 ] );
	subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ i+2 ] );
	subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ i+3 ] );
	subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 3 /* Really large version */
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[  0 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[  1 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[  2 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[  3 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[  4 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[  5 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[  6 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[  7 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[  8 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[  9 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 10 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 11 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 12 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 13 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 14 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 15 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 16 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 17 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 18 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 19 ] );

    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 20 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 21 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 22 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 23 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 24 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 25 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 26 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 27 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 28 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 29 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 30 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 31 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 32 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 33 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 34 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 35 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 36 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 37 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 38 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 39 ] );

    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 40 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 41 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 42 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 43 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 44 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 45 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 46 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 47 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 48 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 49 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 50 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 51 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 52 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 53 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 54 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 55 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 56 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 57 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 58 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 59 ] );

    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 60 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 61 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 62 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 63 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 64 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 65 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 66 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 67 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 68 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 69 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 70 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 71 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 72 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 73 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 74 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 75 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 76 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 77 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 78 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 79 ] );
#else
#error Illegal SHA_CODE_SIZE
#endif

    /* Build message digest */
    digest[ 0 ] += A;
    digest[ 1 ] += B;
    digest[ 2 ] += C;
    digest[ 3 ] += D;
    digest[ 4 ] += E;

	/* W is wiped by the caller */
#undef W
}

#undef ROTL
#undef f1
#undef f2
#undef f3
#undef f4
#undef K1
#undef K2
#undef K3
#undef K4
#undef subRound

#else /* !USE_SHA - Use MD5 */

#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 4
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 0
#define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5Transform

/*
 * MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
 * and put into the public domain
 */

/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */

/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))

/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
	( w += f(x, y, z) + data,  w = w<<s | w>>(32-s),  w += x )

/*
 * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
 * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data.  MD5Update blocks
 * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
 */
static void MD5Transform(__u32 buf[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], __u32 const in[16])
{
	__u32 a, b, c, d;

	a = buf[0];
	b = buf[1];
	c = buf[2];
	d = buf[3];

	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xd76aa478,  7);
	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1]+0xe8c7b756, 12);
	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x242070db, 17);
	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3]+0xc1bdceee, 22);
	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf57c0faf,  7);
	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5]+0x4787c62a, 12);
	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa8304613, 17);
	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7]+0xfd469501, 22);
	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x698098d8,  7);
	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9]+0x8b44f7af, 12);
	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffff5bb1, 17);
	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11]+0x895cd7be, 22);
	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x6b901122,  7);
	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13]+0xfd987193, 12);
	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xa679438e, 17);
	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15]+0x49b40821, 22);

	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xf61e2562,  5);
	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6]+0xc040b340,  9);
	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x265e5a51, 14);
	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0]+0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xd62f105d,  5);
	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10]+0x02441453,  9);
	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0xd8a1e681, 14);
	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4]+0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0x21e1cde6,  5);
	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14]+0xc33707d6,  9);
	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xf4d50d87, 14);
	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8]+0x455a14ed, 20);
	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0xa9e3e905,  5);
	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2]+0xfcefa3f8,  9);
	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0x676f02d9, 14);
	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12]+0x8d2a4c8a, 20);

	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xfffa3942,  4);
	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8]+0x8771f681, 11);
	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x6d9d6122, 16);
	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14]+0xfde5380c, 23);
	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xa4beea44,  4);
	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4]+0x4bdecfa9, 11);
	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0xf6bb4b60, 16);
	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10]+0xbebfbc70, 23);
	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0x289b7ec6,  4);
	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0]+0xeaa127fa, 11);
	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xd4ef3085, 16);
	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6]+0x04881d05, 23);
	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0xd9d4d039,  4);
	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12]+0xe6db99e5, 11);
	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0x1fa27cf8, 16);
	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 2]+0xc4ac5665, 23);

	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xf4292244,  6);
	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 7]+0x432aff97, 10);
	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xab9423a7, 15);
	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 5]+0xfc93a039, 21);
	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x655b59c3,  6);
	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 3]+0x8f0ccc92, 10);
	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffeff47d, 15);
	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 1]+0x85845dd1, 21);
	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x6fa87e4f,  6);
	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15]+0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa3014314, 15);
	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13]+0x4e0811a1, 21);
	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf7537e82,  6);
	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11]+0xbd3af235, 10);
	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 9]+0xeb86d391, 21);

	buf[0] += a;
	buf[1] += b;
	buf[2] += c;
	buf[3] += d;
}

#undef F1
#undef F2
#undef F3
#undef F4
#undef MD5STEP

#endif /* !USE_SHA */

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy extraction routines
 *
 *********************************************************************/

#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER		1
#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY	2
#define TMP_BUF_SIZE			(HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE)
#define SEC_XFER_SIZE			(TMP_BUF_SIZE*4)

static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
			       size_t nbytes, int flags);

/*
 * This utility inline function is responsible for transfering entropy
 * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool.  We pull
 * randomness under two conditions; one is if there isn't enough entropy
 * in the secondary pool.  The other is after we have extracted 1024 bytes,
 * at which point we do a "catastrophic reseeding".
 */
static inline void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r,
				       size_t nbytes, __u32 *tmp,
				       size_t tmpsize)
{
	if (r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
	    r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo.POOLBITS) {
		int nwords = min_t(int,
				   r->poolinfo.poolwords - r->entropy_count/32,
				   tmpsize / 4);

		DEBUG_ENT("xfer %d from primary to %s (have %d, need %d)\n",
			  nwords * 32,
			  r == sec_random_state ? "secondary" : "unknown",
			  r->entropy_count, nbytes * 8);

		extract_entropy(random_state, tmp, nwords * 4, 0);
		add_entropy_words(r, tmp, nwords);
		credit_entropy_store(r, nwords * 32);
	}
	if (r->extract_count > 1024) {
		DEBUG_ENT("reseeding %s with %d from primary\n",
			  r == sec_random_state ? "secondary" : "unknown",
			  tmpsize * 8);
		extract_entropy(random_state, tmp, tmpsize, 0);
		add_entropy_words(r, tmp, tmpsize / 4);
		r->extract_count = 0;
	}
}

/*
 * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
 * returns it in a buffer.  This function computes how many remaining
 * bits of entropy are left in the pool, but it does not restrict the
 * number of bytes that are actually obtained.  If the EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER
 * flag is given, then the buf pointer is assumed to be in user space.
 *
 * If the EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY flag is given, then we are actually
 * extracting entropy from the secondary pool, and can refill from the
 * primary pool if needed.
 *
 * Note: extract_entropy() assumes that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
 */
static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
			       size_t nbytes, int flags)
{
	ssize_t ret, i;
	__u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE];
	__u32 x;

	add_timer_randomness(&extract_timer_state, nbytes);

	/* Redundant, but just in case... */
	if (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS)
		r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;

	if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY)
		xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes, tmp, sizeof(tmp));

	DEBUG_ENT("%s has %d bits, want %d bits\n",
		  r == sec_random_state ? "secondary" :
		  r == random_state ? "primary" : "unknown",
		  r->entropy_count, nbytes * 8);

	if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes)
		r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
	else
		r->entropy_count = 0;

	if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);

	r->extract_count += nbytes;

	ret = 0;
	while (nbytes) {
		/*
		 * Check if we need to break out or reschedule....
		 */
		if ((flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) && current->need_resched) {
			if (signal_pending(current)) {
				if (ret == 0)
					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
				break;
			}
			schedule();
		}

		/* Hash the pool to get the output */
		tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
		tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
		tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
		tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
#ifdef USE_SHA
		tmp[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
#endif
		/*
		 * As we hash the pool, we mix intermediate values of
		 * the hash back into the pool.  This eliminates
		 * backtracking attacks (where the attacker knows
		 * the state of the pool plus the current outputs, and
		 * attempts to find previous ouputs), unless the hash
		 * function can be inverted.
		 */
		for (i = 0, x = 0; i < r->poolinfo.poolwords; i += 16, x+=2) {
			HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp, r->pool+i);
			add_entropy_words(r, &tmp[x%HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], 1);
		}

		/*
		 * In case the hash function has some recognizable
		 * output pattern, we fold it in half.
		 */
		for (i = 0; i <  HASH_BUFFER_SIZE/2; i++)
			tmp[i] ^= tmp[i + (HASH_BUFFER_SIZE+1)/2];
#if HASH_BUFFER_SIZE & 1	/* There's a middle word to deal with */
		x = tmp[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE/2];
		x ^= (x >> 16);		/* Fold it in half */
		((__u16 *)tmp)[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE-1] = (__u16)x;
#endif

		/* Copy data to destination buffer */
		i = min(nbytes, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE*sizeof(__u32)/2);
		if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) {
			i -= copy_to_user(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
			if (!i) {
				ret = -EFAULT;
				break;
			}
		} else
			memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
		nbytes -= i;
		buf += i;
		ret += i;
		add_timer_randomness(&extract_timer_state, nbytes);
	}

	/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));

	return ret;
}

/*
 * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
 * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
 * numbers, etc.
 */
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
{
	if (sec_random_state)
		extract_entropy(sec_random_state, (char *) buf, nbytes,
				EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY);
	else if (random_state)
		extract_entropy(random_state, (char *) buf, nbytes, 0);
	else
		printk(KERN_NOTICE "get_random_bytes called before "
				   "random driver initialization\n");
}

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Functions to interface with Linux
 *
 *********************************************************************/

/*
 * Initialize the random pool with standard stuff.
 *
 * NOTE: This is an OS-dependent function.
 */
static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
{
	struct timeval 	tv;
	__u32		words[2];
	char 		*p;
	int		i;

	do_gettimeofday(&tv);
	words[0] = tv.tv_sec;
	words[1] = tv.tv_usec;
	add_entropy_words(r, words, 2);

	/*
	 *	This doesn't lock system.utsname. However, we are generating
	 *	entropy so a race with a name set here is fine.
	 */
	p = (char *) &system_utsname;
	for (i = sizeof(system_utsname) / sizeof(words); i; i--) {
		memcpy(words, p, sizeof(words));
		add_entropy_words(r, words, sizeof(words)/4);
		p += sizeof(words);
	}
}

void __init rand_initialize(void)
{
	int i;

	if (create_entropy_store(DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE, &random_state))
		return;		/* Error, return */
	if (batch_entropy_init(BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE, random_state))
		return;		/* Error, return */
	if (create_entropy_store(SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE, &sec_random_state))
		return;		/* Error, return */
	clear_entropy_store(random_state);
	clear_entropy_store(sec_random_state);
	init_std_data(random_state);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
	sysctl_init_random(random_state);
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_S390
	for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++)
		irq_timer_state[i] = NULL;
#endif
	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BLKDEV; i++)
		blkdev_timer_state[i] = NULL;
	memset(&keyboard_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
	memset(&mouse_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
	memset(&extract_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
	extract_timer_state.dont_count_entropy = 1;
}

#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_S390
void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
{
	struct timer_rand_state *state;

	if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
		return;

	/*
	 * If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
	 * source.
	 */
	state = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (state) {
		memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
		irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
	}
}
#endif

void rand_initialize_blkdev(int major, int mode)
{
	struct timer_rand_state *state;

	if (major >= MAX_BLKDEV || blkdev_timer_state[major])
		return;

	/*
	 * If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
	 * source.
	 */
	state = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), mode);
	if (state) {
		memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
		blkdev_timer_state[major] = state;
	}
}


static ssize_t
random_read(struct file * file, char * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
	DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
	ssize_t			n, retval = 0, count = 0;

	if (nbytes == 0)
		return 0;

	add_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);
	while (nbytes > 0) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);

		n = nbytes;
		if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
			n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
		if (n > random_state->entropy_count / 8)
			n = random_state->entropy_count / 8;
		if (n == 0) {
			if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
				retval = -EAGAIN;
				break;
			}
			if (signal_pending(current)) {
				retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
				break;
			}
			schedule();
			continue;
		}
		n = extract_entropy(sec_random_state, buf, n,
				    EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER |
				    EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY);
		if (n < 0) {
			retval = n;
			break;
		}
		count += n;
		buf += n;
		nbytes -= n;
		break;		/* This break makes the device work */
				/* like a named pipe */
	}
	current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
	remove_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);

	/*
	 * If we gave the user some bytes, update the access time.
	 */
	if (count != 0) {
		UPDATE_ATIME(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
	}

	return (count ? count : retval);
}

static ssize_t
urandom_read(struct file * file, char * buf,
		      size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
	return extract_entropy(sec_random_state, buf, nbytes,
			       EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER |
			       EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY);
}

static unsigned int
random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
	unsigned int mask;

	poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
	mask = 0;
	if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
	if (random_state->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
		mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
	return mask;
}

static ssize_t
random_write(struct file * file, const char * buffer,
	     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
	int		ret = 0;
	size_t		bytes;
	__u32 		buf[16];
	const char 	*p = buffer;
	size_t		c = count;

	while (c > 0) {
		bytes = min(c, sizeof(buf));

		bytes -= copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes);
		if (!bytes) {
			ret = -EFAULT;
			break;
		}
		c -= bytes;
		p += bytes;

		add_entropy_words(random_state, buf, (bytes + 3) / 4);
	}
	if (p == buffer) {
		return (ssize_t)ret;
	} else {
		file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
		mark_inode_dirty(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
		return (ssize_t)(p - buffer);
	}
}

static int
random_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
	     unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
	int *p, size, ent_count;
	int retval;

	switch (cmd) {
	case RNDGETENTCNT:
		ent_count = random_state->entropy_count;
		if (put_user(ent_count, (int *) arg))
			return -EFAULT;
		return 0;
	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
			return -EPERM;
		if (get_user(ent_count, (int *) arg))
			return -EFAULT;
		credit_entropy_store(random_state, ent_count);
		/*
		 * Wake up waiting processes if we have enough
		 * entropy.
		 */
		if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
			wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
		return 0;
	case RNDGETPOOL:
		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
			return -EPERM;
		p = (int *) arg;
		ent_count = random_state->entropy_count;
		if (put_user(ent_count, p++) ||
		    get_user(size, p) ||
		    put_user(random_state->poolinfo.poolwords, p++))
			return -EFAULT;
		if (size < 0)
			return -EINVAL;
		if (size > random_state->poolinfo.poolwords)
			size = random_state->poolinfo.poolwords;
		if (copy_to_user(p, random_state->pool, size * sizeof(__u32)))
			return -EFAULT;
		return 0;
	case RNDADDENTROPY:
		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
			return -EPERM;
		p = (int *) arg;
		if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
			return -EFAULT;
		if (ent_count < 0)
			return -EINVAL;
		if (get_user(size, p++))
			return -EFAULT;
		retval = random_write(file, (const char *) p,
				      size, &file->f_pos);
		if (retval < 0)
			return retval;
		credit_entropy_store(random_state, ent_count);
		/*
		 * Wake up waiting processes if we have enough
		 * entropy.
		 */
		if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
			wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
		return 0;
	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
			return -EPERM;
		random_state->entropy_count = 0;
		return 0;
	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
		/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. */
		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
			return -EPERM;
		clear_entropy_store(random_state);
		init_std_data(random_state);
		return 0;
	default:
		return -EINVAL;
	}
}

struct file_operations random_fops = {
	read:		random_read,
	write:		random_write,
	poll:		random_poll,
	ioctl:		random_ioctl,
};

struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
	read:		urandom_read,
	write:		random_write,
	ioctl:		random_ioctl,
};

/***************************************************************
 * Random UUID interface
 *
 * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
 * drivers.
 ***************************************************************/

/*
 * Generate random UUID
 */
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16])
{
	get_random_bytes(uuid_out, 16);
	/* Set UUID version to 4 --- truely random generation */
	uuid_out[6] = (uuid_out[6] & 0x0F) | 0x40;
	/* Set the UUID variant to DCE */
	uuid_out[8] = (uuid_out[8] & 0x3F) | 0x80;
}

/********************************************************************
 *
 * Sysctl interface
 *
 ********************************************************************/

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL

#include <linux/sysctl.h>

static int sysctl_poolsize;
static int min_read_thresh, max_read_thresh;
static int min_write_thresh, max_write_thresh;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];

/*
 * This function handles a request from the user to change the pool size
 * of the primary entropy store.
 */
static int change_poolsize(int poolsize)
{
	struct entropy_store	*new_store, *old_store;
	int			ret;

	if ((ret = create_entropy_store(poolsize, &new_store)))
		return ret;

	add_entropy_words(new_store, random_state->pool,
			  random_state->poolinfo.poolwords);
	credit_entropy_store(new_store, random_state->entropy_count);

	sysctl_init_random(new_store);
	old_store = random_state;
	random_state = batch_tqueue.data = new_store;
	free_entropy_store(old_store);
	return 0;
}

static int proc_do_poolsize(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
			    void *buffer, size_t *lenp)
{
	int	ret;

	sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;

	ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp);
	if (ret || !write ||
	    (sysctl_poolsize == random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES))
		return ret;

	return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);
}

static int poolsize_strategy(ctl_table *table, int *name, int nlen,
			     void *oldval, size_t *oldlenp,
			     void *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
	unsigned int	len;

	sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;

	/*
	 * We only handle the write case, since the read case gets
	 * handled by the default handler (and we don't care if the
	 * write case happens twice; it's harmless).
	 */
	if (newval && newlen) {
		len = newlen;
		if (len > table->maxlen)
			len = table->maxlen;
		if (copy_from_user(table->data, newval, len))
			return -EFAULT;
	}

	if (sysctl_poolsize != random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES)
		return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);

	return 0;
}

/*
 * These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
 * UUID.  The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
 * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
 *
 * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
 * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format.  If accesses via the
 * sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
 */
static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
			void *buffer, size_t *lenp)
{
	ctl_table	fake_table;
	unsigned char	buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;

	uuid = table->data;
	if (!uuid) {
		uuid = tmp_uuid;
		uuid[8] = 0;
	}
	if (uuid[8] == 0)
		generate_random_uuid(uuid);

	sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-"
		"%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
		uuid[0],  uuid[1],  uuid[2],  uuid[3],
		uuid[4],  uuid[5],  uuid[6],  uuid[7],
		uuid[8],  uuid[9],  uuid[10], uuid[11],
		uuid[12], uuid[13], uuid[14], uuid[15]);
	fake_table.data = buf;
	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);

	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, filp, buffer, lenp);
}

static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int *name, int nlen,
			 void *oldval, size_t *oldlenp,
			 void *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
	unsigned char	tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
	unsigned int	len;

	if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
		return 1;

	uuid = table->data;
	if (!uuid) {
		uuid = tmp_uuid;
		uuid[8] = 0;
	}
	if (uuid[8] == 0)
		generate_random_uuid(uuid);

	if (get_user(len, oldlenp))
		return -EFAULT;
	if (len) {
		if (len > 16)
			len = 16;
		if (copy_to_user(oldval, uuid, len) ||
		    put_user(len, oldlenp))
			return -EFAULT;
	}
	return 1;
}

ctl_table random_table[] = {
	{RANDOM_POOLSIZE, "poolsize",
	 &sysctl_poolsize, sizeof(int), 0644, NULL,
	 &proc_do_poolsize, &poolsize_strategy},
	{RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT, "entropy_avail",
	 NULL, sizeof(int), 0444, NULL,
	 &proc_dointvec},
	{RANDOM_READ_THRESH, "read_wakeup_threshold",
	 &random_read_wakeup_thresh, sizeof(int), 0644, NULL,
	 &proc_dointvec_minmax, &sysctl_intvec, 0,
	 &min_read_thresh, &max_read_thresh},
	{RANDOM_WRITE_THRESH, "write_wakeup_threshold",
	 &random_write_wakeup_thresh, sizeof(int), 0644, NULL,
	 &proc_dointvec_minmax, &sysctl_intvec, 0,
	 &min_write_thresh, &max_write_thresh},
	{RANDOM_BOOT_ID, "boot_id",
	 &sysctl_bootid, 16, 0444, NULL,
	 &proc_do_uuid, &uuid_strategy},
	{RANDOM_UUID, "uuid",
	 NULL, 16, 0444, NULL,
	 &proc_do_uuid, &uuid_strategy},
	{0}
};

static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state)
{
	min_read_thresh = 8;
	min_write_thresh = 0;
	max_read_thresh = max_write_thresh = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
	random_table[1].data = &random_state->entropy_count;
}
#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */

/********************************************************************
 *
 * Random funtions for networking
 *
 ********************************************************************/

/*
 * TCP initial sequence number picking.  This uses the random number
 * generator to pick an initial secret value.  This value is hashed
 * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
 * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints.  This defeats
 * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
 * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
 *
 * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
 * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
 * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
 */

/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))

/*
 * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
 * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
 * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
 * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
 */
#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)	\
	(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32-s)))
#define K1 0
#define K2 013240474631UL
#define K3 015666365641UL

/*
 * Basic cut-down MD4 transform.  Returns only 32 bits of result.
 */
static __u32 halfMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
{
	__u32	a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];

	/* Round 1 */
	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K1,  3);
	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[1] + K1,  7);
	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K1, 11);
	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[3] + K1, 19);
	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[4] + K1,  3);
	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K1,  7);
	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[6] + K1, 11);
	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K1, 19);

	/* Round 2 */
	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K2,  3);
	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[3] + K2,  5);
	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[5] + K2,  9);
	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K2, 13);
	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K2,  3);
	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[2] + K2,  5);
	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[4] + K2,  9);
	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K2, 13);

	/* Round 3 */
	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[3] + K3,  3);
	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[7] + K3,  9);
	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K3, 11);
	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K3, 15);
	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K3,  3);
	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K3,  9);
	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[0] + K3, 11);
	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[4] + K3, 15);

	return buf[1] + b;	/* "most hashed" word */
	/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}

#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)

static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
{
	__u32	a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];

	/* Round 1 */
	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1,  3);
	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1,  7);
	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1,  3);
	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1,  7);
	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1,  3);
	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1,  7);
	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);

	/* Round 2 */
	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2,  3);
	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2,  5);
	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2,  9);
	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2,  3);
	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2,  5);
	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2,  9);
	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2,  3);
	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2,  5);
	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2,  9);
	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);

	/* Round 3 */
	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3,  3);
	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3,  9);
	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3,  3);
	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3,  9);
	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3,  3);
	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3,  9);
	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);

	return buf[1] + b;	/* "most hashed" word */
	/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}
#endif

#undef ROUND
#undef F
#undef G
#undef H
#undef K1
#undef K2
#undef K3

/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
#define REKEY_INTERVAL	300
/*
 * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
 * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
 * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
 *
 * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
 * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
 * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
 * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
 * 	to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
 * 	clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
 *
 * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
 * 4.55 hours.
 *
 * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
 * 			Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
 *
 */
#define COUNT_BITS	8
#define COUNT_MASK	( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
#define HASH_BITS	24
#define HASH_MASK	( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )

static struct keydata {
	time_t rekey_time;
	__u32	count;		// already shifted to the final position
	__u32	secret[12];
} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];

static spinlock_t ip_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
static unsigned int ip_cnt;

static struct keydata *__check_and_rekey(time_t time)
{
	struct keydata *keyptr;
	spin_lock_bh(&ip_lock);
	keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];
	if (!keyptr->rekey_time || (time - keyptr->rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
		keyptr = &ip_keydata[1^(ip_cnt&1)];
		keyptr->rekey_time = time;
		get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
		keyptr->count = (ip_cnt&COUNT_MASK)<<HASH_BITS;
		mb();
		ip_cnt++;
	}
	spin_unlock_bh(&ip_lock);
	return keyptr;
}

static inline struct keydata *check_and_rekey(time_t time)
{
	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];

	rmb();
	if (!keyptr->rekey_time || (time - keyptr->rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
		keyptr = __check_and_rekey(time);
	}

	return keyptr;
}

#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
				   __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
	struct timeval 	tv;
	__u32		seq;
	__u32		hash[12];
	struct keydata *keyptr;

	/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
	 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
	 */

	do_gettimeofday(&tv);	/* We need the usecs below... */
	keyptr = check_and_rekey(tv.tv_sec);

	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
	hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
	memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32)*7);

	seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
	seq += keyptr->count;
	seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;

	return seq;
}

__u32 secure_ipv6_id(__u32 *daddr)
{
	struct keydata *keyptr;

	keyptr = check_and_rekey(CURRENT_TIME);

	return halfMD4Transform(daddr, keyptr->secret);
}

#endif


__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
				 __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
	struct timeval 	tv;
	__u32		seq;
	__u32	hash[4];
	struct keydata *keyptr;

	/*
	 * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
	 */
	do_gettimeofday(&tv);	/* We need the usecs below... */
	keyptr = check_and_rekey(tv.tv_sec);

	/*
	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
	 *  (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
	 *  Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
	 *  then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
	 */
	hash[0]=saddr;
	hash[1]=daddr;
	hash[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
	hash[3]=keyptr->secret[11];

	seq = halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
	seq += keyptr->count;
	/*
	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
	 *	That's funny, Linux has one built in!  Use it!
	 *	(Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
	 */
	seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
#if 0
	printk("init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
	       saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
#endif
	return seq;
}

/*  The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
 *  All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
 */
__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
{
	struct keydata *keyptr;
	__u32 hash[4];

	keyptr = check_and_rekey(CURRENT_TIME);

	/*
	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
	 *  The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
	 *  which is then hashed with random data.
	 */
	hash[0] = daddr;
	hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
	hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];

	return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
/*
 * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
 * Dan Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
 *
 * For linux I implement the 1 minute counter by looking at the jiffies clock.
 * The count is passed in as a parameter, so this code doesn't much care.
 */

#define COOKIEBITS 24	/* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)

static int	syncookie_init;
static __u32	syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];

__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
		__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
{
	__u32 	tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
	__u32	seq;

	/*
	 * Pick two random secrets the first time we need a cookie.
	 */
	if (syncookie_init == 0) {
		get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
		syncookie_init = 1;
	}

	/*
	 * Compute the secure sequence number.
	 * The output should be:
   	 *   HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
	 *      + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
	 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
	 * minute by 1.
	 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
	 * MSS into the second hash value.
	 */

	memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
	tmp[0]=saddr;
	tmp[1]=daddr;
	tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
	HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
	seq = tmp[17] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);

	memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
	tmp[0]=saddr;
	tmp[1]=daddr;
	tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
	tmp[3] = count;	/* minute counter */
	HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);

	/* Add in the second hash and the data */
	return seq + ((tmp[17] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
}

/*
 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
 * range.  This must be checked by the caller.
 *
 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count".  The return value
 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
 */
__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
		__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
	__u32 	tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
	__u32	diff;

	if (syncookie_init == 0)
		return (__u32)-1;	/* Well, duh! */

	/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
	memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
	tmp[0]=saddr;
	tmp[1]=daddr;
	tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
	HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
	cookie -= tmp[17] + sseq;
	/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */

	diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32)-1 >> COOKIEBITS);
	if (diff >= maxdiff)
		return (__u32)-1;

	memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
	tmp[0] = saddr;
	tmp[1] = daddr;
	tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
	tmp[3] = count - diff;	/* minute counter */
	HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);

	return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK;	/* Leaving the data behind */
}
#endif



#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_S390
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_keyboard_randomness);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_mouse_randomness);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_interrupt_randomness);
#endif
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_blkdev_randomness);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(batch_entropy_store);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);