1 /*
2  * AppArmor security module
3  *
4  * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
5  *
6  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7  * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8  *
9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11  * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12  * License.
13  */
14 
15 #include "include/apparmor.h"
16 #include "include/audit.h"
17 #include "include/file.h"
18 #include "include/match.h"
19 #include "include/path.h"
20 #include "include/policy.h"
21 
22 struct file_perms nullperms;
23 
24 
25 /**
26  * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
27  * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28  * @mask: permission mask to convert
29  */
audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer * ab,u32 mask)30 static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
31 {
32 	char str[10];
33 
34 	char *m = str;
35 
36 	if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
37 		*m++ = 'm';
38 	if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ))
39 		*m++ = 'r';
40 	if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD |
41 		    AA_MAY_CHOWN))
42 		*m++ = 'w';
43 	else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
44 		*m++ = 'a';
45 	if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE)
46 		*m++ = 'c';
47 	if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE)
48 		*m++ = 'd';
49 	if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
50 		*m++ = 'l';
51 	if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
52 		*m++ = 'k';
53 	if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
54 		*m++ = 'x';
55 	*m = '\0';
56 
57 	audit_log_string(ab, str);
58 }
59 
60 /**
61  * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
62  * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
63  * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
64  */
file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer * ab,void * va)65 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
66 {
67 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
68 	uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
69 
70 	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
71 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
72 		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
73 	}
74 	if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
75 		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
76 		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
77 	}
78 	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
79 		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
80 		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid);
81 	}
82 
83 	if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
84 		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
85 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
86 	}
87 }
88 
89 /**
90  * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
91  * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
92  * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
93  * @gfp: allocation flags
94  * @op: operation being mediated
95  * @request: permissions requested
96  * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
97  * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
98  * @ouid: object uid
99  * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
100  * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
101  *
102  * Returns: %0 or error on failure
103  */
aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile * profile,struct file_perms * perms,gfp_t gfp,int op,u32 request,const char * name,const char * target,uid_t ouid,const char * info,int error)104 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
105 		  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
106 		  const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
107 {
108 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
109 	struct common_audit_data sa;
110 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
111 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
112 	sa.aad = &aad;
113 	aad.op = op,
114 	aad.fs.request = request;
115 	aad.name = name;
116 	aad.fs.target = target;
117 	aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
118 	aad.info = info;
119 	aad.error = error;
120 
121 	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
122 		u32 mask = perms->audit;
123 
124 		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
125 			mask = 0xffff;
126 
127 		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
128 		sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
129 
130 		if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
131 			return 0;
132 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
133 	} else {
134 		/* only report permissions that were denied */
135 		sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
136 
137 		if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
138 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
139 
140 		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
141 		if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
142 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
143 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
144 			sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
145 
146 		if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
147 			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
148 	}
149 
150 	sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
151 	return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
152 }
153 
154 /**
155  * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
156  * @old: permission set in old mapping
157  *
158  * Returns: new permission mapping
159  */
map_old_perms(u32 old)160 static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
161 {
162 	u32 new = old & 0xf;
163 	if (old & MAY_READ)
164 		new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
165 	if (old & MAY_WRITE)
166 		new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
167 			AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN;
168 	if (old & 0x10)
169 		new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
170 	/* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
171 	 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
172 	 */
173 	if (old & 0x20)
174 		new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
175 	if (old & 0x40)	/* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
176 		new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
177 
178 	return new;
179 }
180 
181 /**
182  * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
183  * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for   (NOT NULL)
184  * @state: state in dfa
185  * @cond:  conditions to consider  (NOT NULL)
186  *
187  * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
188  *       at load time.
189  *
190  * Returns: computed permission set
191  */
compute_perms(struct aa_dfa * dfa,unsigned int state,struct path_cond * cond)192 static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
193 				       struct path_cond *cond)
194 {
195 	struct file_perms perms;
196 
197 	/* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
198 	 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
199 	 * splits the permissions from the dfa.  This mapping can be
200 	 * done at profile load
201 	 */
202 	perms.kill = 0;
203 
204 	if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) {
205 		perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
206 		perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
207 		perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
208 		perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
209 	} else {
210 		perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
211 		perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
212 		perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
213 		perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
214 	}
215 	perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
216 
217 	/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
218 	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
219 		perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
220 	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
221 		perms.allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
222 
223 	return perms;
224 }
225 
226 /**
227  * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
228  * @dfa: to match against  (MAYBE NULL)
229  * @state: state to start matching in
230  * @name: string to match against dfa  (NOT NULL)
231  * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation  (NOT NULL)
232  * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
233  *
234  * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
235  */
aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa * dfa,unsigned int start,const char * name,struct path_cond * cond,struct file_perms * perms)236 unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
237 			  const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
238 			  struct file_perms *perms)
239 {
240 	unsigned int state;
241 	if (!dfa) {
242 		*perms = nullperms;
243 		return DFA_NOMATCH;
244 	}
245 
246 	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
247 	*perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
248 
249 	return state;
250 }
251 
252 /**
253  * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
254  * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion  (NOT NULL)
255  *
256  * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
257  */
is_deleted(struct dentry * dentry)258 static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
259 {
260 	if (d_unlinked(dentry) && dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0)
261 		return 1;
262 	return 0;
263 }
264 
265 /**
266  * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
267  * @op: operation being checked
268  * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
269  * @path: path to check permissions of  (NOT NULL)
270  * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
271  * @request: requested permissions
272  * @cond: conditional info for this request  (NOT NULL)
273  *
274  * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
275  */
aa_path_perm(int op,struct aa_profile * profile,struct path * path,int flags,u32 request,struct path_cond * cond)276 int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
277 		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond)
278 {
279 	char *buffer = NULL;
280 	struct file_perms perms = {};
281 	const char *name, *info = NULL;
282 	int error;
283 
284 	flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
285 	error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info);
286 	if (error) {
287 		if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
288 			/* Access to open files that are deleted are
289 			 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
290 			 */
291 			error = 0;
292 			info = NULL;
293 			perms.allow = request;
294 		}
295 	} else {
296 		aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
297 			     &perms);
298 		if (request & ~perms.allow)
299 			error = -EACCES;
300 	}
301 	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
302 			      NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
303 	kfree(buffer);
304 
305 	return error;
306 }
307 
308 /**
309  * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
310  * @link: link permission set
311  * @target: target permission set
312  *
313  * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
314  * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
315  * a subset of permissions that the target has.
316  *
317  * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
318  */
xindex_is_subset(u32 link,u32 target)319 static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
320 {
321 	if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
322 	    ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
323 		return 0;
324 
325 	return 1;
326 }
327 
328 /**
329  * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
330  * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
331  * @old_dentry: the target dentry  (NOT NULL)
332  * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in  (NOT NULL)
333  * @new_dentry: the link being created  (NOT NULL)
334  *
335  * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair.  Permission
336  * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
337  * first, and if allowed, the target is tested.  The target test
338  * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
339  * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
340  *
341  * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
342  * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
343  *
344  * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
345  */
aa_path_link(struct aa_profile * profile,struct dentry * old_dentry,struct path * new_dir,struct dentry * new_dentry)346 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
347 		 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
348 {
349 	struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
350 	struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
351 	struct path_cond cond = {
352 		old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
353 		old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
354 	};
355 	char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
356 	const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL;
357 	struct file_perms lperms, perms;
358 	u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
359 	unsigned int state;
360 	int error;
361 
362 	lperms = nullperms;
363 
364 	/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
365 	error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname,
366 			     &info);
367 	if (error)
368 		goto audit;
369 
370 	/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
371 	error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname,
372 			     &info);
373 	if (error)
374 		goto audit;
375 
376 	error = -EACCES;
377 	/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
378 	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
379 			     &cond, &lperms);
380 
381 	if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
382 		goto audit;
383 
384 	/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
385 	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
386 	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms);
387 
388 	/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
389 	 * in the link pair.
390 	 */
391 	lperms.audit = perms.audit;
392 	lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
393 	lperms.kill = perms.kill;
394 
395 	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
396 		info = "target restricted";
397 		goto audit;
398 	}
399 
400 	/* done if link subset test is not required */
401 	if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
402 		goto done_tests;
403 
404 	/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
405 	 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
406 	 */
407 	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond,
408 		     &perms);
409 
410 	/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
411 	request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
412 	lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
413 
414 	request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
415 	if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
416 		goto audit;
417 	} else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
418 		   !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
419 		lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
420 		request |= MAY_EXEC;
421 		info = "link not subset of target";
422 		goto audit;
423 	}
424 
425 done_tests:
426 	error = 0;
427 
428 audit:
429 	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
430 			      lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
431 	kfree(buffer);
432 	kfree(buffer2);
433 
434 	return error;
435 }
436 
437 /**
438  * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
439  * @op: operation being checked
440  * @profile: profile being enforced   (NOT NULL)
441  * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on  (NOT NULL)
442  * @request: requested permissions
443  *
444  * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
445  */
aa_file_perm(int op,struct aa_profile * profile,struct file * file,u32 request)446 int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
447 		 u32 request)
448 {
449 	struct path_cond cond = {
450 		.uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
451 		.mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
452 	};
453 
454 	return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
455 			    request, &cond);
456 }
457