Lines Matching refs:which
42 interface in this state, and which thus potentially rely on an uninitialized
92 entropy from various non-hwrng sources in various subsystems, all of which
106 access encrypted storage which might need random numbers. systemd itself
173 before generating the image it should be safe to credit entropy, which can
188 seed stored in the EFI System Partition (ESP) to the booted OS, which allows
194 the 'system token' is set, which is written to the machine's firmware NVRAM.
218 kernel's entropy pool size, which defaults to 512 bytes. This means updating
221 which should be safe even with FAT file system drivers built into
257 RNG devices, which they really should all do in 2019. Complain to your
302 the kernel's entropy pool to be initialized, which is the whole problem we
314 seed/a MAC address/host ID to operate, all of which are not available during
331 system behavior (such as scheduling effects) which the kernel either
336 in kernel (which would be very welcome of course, but wouldn't really help
353 delay, which this doesn't solve), there's hence little benefit for us to
364 multiple machines (which the 'system token' mentioned above is supposed to