Lines Matching refs:processes

11 monitored processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of
52 To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes
53 into two categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user
55 processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged processes bypass
57 monitoring is fully available to privileged processes without access,
60 Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check
66 independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and
69 Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_PERFMON capability are treated
70 as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance
79 processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring and observability
87 Prior Linux v5.9 unprivileged processes using perf_events system call
90 So unprivileged processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are
93 be provided for processes to make performance monitoring and observability
96 Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can
98 performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example,
169 inherent processes with CAP_PERFMON and other required capabilities so that
220 or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_
226 perf_events *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes
243      imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK
252      unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
259      unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
282 The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing
285 per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping by the user processes to
294 wants to start two or more performance monitoring processes, the user is
296 monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record
298 allocates all available 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to
302 for processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf